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 Market institutions can be thought of as rules
that govern trading. The double auction is a
case in point. Double auction trading allows
both buyers and sellers to suggest prices, and
transactions occur if either buyers or sellers
accept an offer from the other side of the
market. A wide variety of market institutions
exist in the field and on the Internet. Most
stock exchanges and electronic marketplaces
like EnronOnline resemble the double
auction. However, one-sided versions of the
double auction are prevalent as well. Reverse
auctions exist within which sellers compete to
sell products or services to one or more buyers,
so the bid prices proceed downwards instead
of upwards. FreeMarkets is but one e-market-
place providing online reverse auctions.
Conversely, variants of the English auction –
where buyers only are allowed to bid and
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Also, English auction trading rules
characterize several web-based auctions like
Onsale and eBay.
How come so many types of market
institutions emerge in the field and on the
Internet? One explanation is that liquidity
considerations yield increasing returns to market
size; “order flow generates order flow”. Thus, a
market institution that becomes viable in a
specific market will become entrenched. An
alternative conjecture is that the emergence of
market institutions is very sensitive to environ-
mental details, e.g., the kind of good traded as
well as the (revealed) institutional preferences of
the relevant traders (Friedman, 1993). 
Recently a small number of laboratory
studies have focused on how market
institutions are shaped and emerge endog-
enously as a result of traders’ preferences and
revealed choices1. This literature consists of
mainly exploratory as opposed to theory-
driven laboratory experiments. The purpose
of exploratory experimentation is a search for
empirical regularities and phenomena in the
absence of well-formed and relevant theory
(Steinle, 1997). Relevant examples of this
approach vis-à-vis endogenous market
institutions are Kirchsteiger et al. (2001) and
Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2002). The
former study reports experiment in which
buyers (sellers) choose whom to inform about
offers to buy (sell). Acceptance of an offer
leads to a transaction, and every trader initially
informed about the offer observes the
confirmed prices as well. Thus, complete
dissemination of offers and prices produces a
market institution equal to the double
auction. The evidence shows a marked
revealed preference for informing the other
side of the market about offers while
concealing this information from compe-
titors. Thus, the endogenous market
institution resembles a “secret offer double
auction”. Ivanoa-Stenzel and Salmon examine
buyers’ preferences between alternative
auction institutions, and find that the English
auction is preferred to the sealed-bid auction. 
This paper adds to the existent experi-
mental evidence on endogenous market
institutions. The objective of the present study
is to analyze the linkage between traders’
institutional preferences, decision rules and
what types of market institutions that emerge
as viable. Specifically, subjects have to choose
amongst the double, bid and offer auction.
The bid auction is a variant of the English
auction, and restricts the ability to initiate
contracts to the buyer side of the market.
Conversely, the offer auction is a type of
reverse auction in which sellers only may
communicate offers to sell. Confirmed prices
are common knowledge, and each type of
market institution is sequential in the sense
that traders negotiate prices continuously
during real-time sequences. 
The subjects’ institutional preferences are
revealed by means of laboratory referendums,
in which the subjects elect one of the three
alternative market institutions and engage in
trading. Each experimental session consists of
8 consecutive election and trading rounds.
The payoffs earned by subjects are not directly
determined by their voting behavior, but
ultimately depend upon the prices agreed to
during trading rounds. 
Two different voting rules are used to
aggregate the subjects’ institutional prefer-
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1.  The convention in experimental economics have been to superimpose trading rules upon laboratory market
environments, and to juxtapose at least two different sets of exogenous rules in order to facilitate clear-cut
institutional comparisons (see, e.g., Plott and Smith, 1978, Ketcham et al., 1984 and Bronfman et al., 1996).
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benchmark case. This voting mechanism
corresponds to the Anglo-American first-past-
the-post system, which is the most widespread
method of ranking candidates in an election
(Levin and Nalebuff, 1995). Plurality rule
allows each voter to abstain or to vote for one
of the three trading institutions. The
institution with the most votes wins the
election. Second, approval voting is employed.
This is a regularly proposed and adopted
alternative to plurality rule (Brams and Nagel,
1991 and Mueller, 1989). Approval voting
permits voters to either abstain or to vote for
one, two or all three institutional alternatives.
Approving of all three auctions is equivalent
to casting a blank vote since it has no
differential impact. The trading institution
with the most votes is selected. In sum,
plurality voting rules effectively aggregate
preferences based upon the first choices of
buyers and sellers. Approval voting aggregates
preferences that may include second choices
as well, and thereby facilitates a ranking of
candidates on the basis of more complete
individual preferences. 
Previous experimental analyses of plurality
rule versus approval voting have considered
electoral outcomes in laboratory environ-
ments in which the payoffs derived from
winning candidates are exogenous and voter
types’ preferences over candidates are
common knowledge (Rapoport et al., 1991
and Forsythe et al., 1996). A chief aim of these
papers has been to compare voters’ behavior
with theoretical predictions derived from
various models of strategic voting. The present
study is comparatively less theory-driven, and
mainly seeks to probe empirically whether,
and possibly how, the two voting mechanisms
affect the endogenous implementation of bid,
double and offer auctions. This exploratory
objective may be concretized in the form of
the following research topics:
1. Institutional preferences and trader type
The participants in every laboratory session
are randomly assigned a trader identity as
either buyer or seller. The trading role of each
subject is private knowledge and remains
constant across voting and trading rounds.
However, the demographics of the electorate
– identical proportions of buyers and sellers –
are common knowledge. Preferences over the
three electoral alternatives are induced by
means of written information defining the
different trading rules as well as through test
trading on each auction. 
An objective of this study is to describe the
institutional preferences of buyers and sellers
as revealed in the plurality rule and approval
voting laboratory elections. Another intention
is to investigate the extent to which individual
buyers and sellers cast votes concordantly.
2. Effective number of auctions
All three auctions are considered effective
electoral candidates if each of them receives
33.33% of the vote in a laboratory election.
The number of effective auctions falls below
three if voters concentrate their votes on two
or one of the alternative auction types. Specifi-
cally, the effective number of candidates is
defined as the reciprocal of the Hirschman-
Herfindahl index used to quantify the degree
of concentration of sales in an industry (Cox,
1997). Hence, it is a measure of how
concentrated vote shares are in electoral
contests, and in a three-candidate race neces-
sarily varies between one and three. 
In elections with three candidates and just
one winner, Duverger’s law asserts that
plurality rule tends to yield two effective
candidates only (Duverger, 1967). The reason
is that (strategic) voters seek to avoid wasting
votes on candidates with low chances of
winning. Thus, it is likely that a three-
candidate race may degenerate into a serious
race between the two candidates considered
Endogenous market institutions: Experimental evidence 93
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prediction applies to the approval voting
mechanism (Weber, 1995).
The empirical issue addressed below is
whether plurality rule induces discernible
Duverger effects when voters choose amongst
bid, double and offer auctions, as well as
which auction alternative the electorate in that
case winnows out. A related aim is to
investigate whether the number of effective
institutions during plurality rule deviates
negatively and significantly from the quantity
of effective auctions induced by approval
voting. 
3. Auction prices
A final intention of this study is to gauge
whether the level of prices varies across market
institutions, provided at least two types of
auctions are chosen in the laboratory
elections. If so, the adopted null hypothesis is
that no significant differences across auction
types obtain. The rationale is twofold. First,
economic theory does not predict any specific
ordering of bid-double-offer auction prices in
the case of multiple buyers and sellers (Davis
and Holt, 1993). Second, the existent
laboratory evidence is inconclusive. Smith
(1964) reported laboratory data that
supported his empirical a priori hypothesis
that (mean and equilibrium) bid-auction
prices tend to be greater than double-auction
prices, which again tend to be greater than
offer-auction prices. These institutional
differences were statistically significant.
Nevertheless, Walker and Williams (1988)
reexamined Smith’s results, and initially
observed an ordering of prices whereby
double-auction prices are greater than offer-
auction prices, which tend to be greater than
bid-auction prices. Additional experiments
revealed a ranking of prices that was weakly
consistent with Smith’s conclusion, but none
of the observed institutional differences were
statistically discernible at conventional
significance levels.
The main finding in this paper is twofold.
First, the evidence shows that varying voting
rules matter and influence which auctions are
selected as trading institutions. When subjects
are restricted to cast one vote only (plurality
rule), buyers prefer the bid auction whereas
sellers vote for the offer auction. Thus, agents
opt for the trading institution that restricts the
ability to suggest prices to their own side of
the market. However, a majority of voters
choose to express second choices also when
approval voting rules apply, the implication of
which is that the double auction emerges as a
viable trading institution as well. Equivalently,
the effective number of auctions is higher
under approval voting. Second, prices vary
with auction type. Bid prices are lower than
double auction prices, which are lower than
offer auction prices. Hence, this is consistent
with buyers voting for the bid auction and
sellers’ preference for the offer auction. 
The remainder of this paper is organized
in four sections. The first two describe the
experimental design and the results. The
subsequent section discusses the findings and
the last section concludes.
Experimental design
Voting stage
Each experimental session contained eight
laboratory elections using one voting
mechanism only. During the plurality rule
sessions a subject could vote for one of the
three auctions. Approval voting enabled each
experimental subject to vote for one, two or
all three of the alternative trading institutions.
In addition both voting rules allowed for
abstention.
The three electoral alternatives – offer,
double and bid auction – were explicitly listed
alphabetically on the voter ballots as “Ask
94 Morten Søberg
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auction”. Each ballot included a subject
identification number for data-collecting
purposes. Subjects voted in private and used
pens to mark their preferred alternative(s).
After each laboratory election the results were
listed on the blackboard. In the event of ties,
a dice was thrown to determine a winner. The
sole purpose of the elections was to decide
upon common trading rules. No financial
incentives applied to this part of the
experiment. 
Trading stage
Trading on the chosen auction type followed
each laboratory election, and occurred on a
computerized market where traders com-
municated with each other via computer
terminals2. No additional interaction between
traders was permitted. Each trading round
lasted three minutes. During each trading
stage four buyers interacted with as many
sellers. Their trading roles were specialized
meaning that a buyer (seller) could not buy
and resell (sell and repurchase). Equivalently,
speculation was disallowed. The subjects
retained their trader roles throughout the
entire experimental session. 
Endowing the four buyers with equal
individual unit valuations for four units of a
fictitious homogenous good induced market
demand. A transaction gave a buyer a profit
in experimental dollars equal to the value of
the difference between the assigned value of
the traded unit and the agreed price.
Alternately, assigning each seller unit costs
over four units of the good induced market
supply. A seller’s profit from any transaction
equaled the difference between price and cost
of the traded unit. Each buyer (seller) obtained
Endogenous market institutions: Experimental evidence 95
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Market demand and supply
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(supply) schedule only. Trading was sequential
in as much as each buyer (seller) could buy
(sell) one unit at a time. Neither demand nor
supply schedules were altered between trading
rounds. The aggregated individual demand
and supply schedules are depicted as market
demand and supply in Figure 1. Demand and
supply are nominated in experimental dollars
and units are measured along the horizontal
axis.
The efficient trading volume outcome was
16 units. As can be seen from the figure, there
was a range of price equilibria because all
transactions could be conducted at prices in
the interval [30,70] experimental dollars. The
outlined market environment was invariant
with regard to auction type. 
The double-auction trading rules allowed
buyers (sellers) to post offers to buy (offers to
sell) at any time during a trading period3.
Buyers’ (sellers’) offers were called bids (asks).
A lexicographic improvement rule required
any buyer (seller) to specify higher (lower)
prices in order to replace a former bid (ask) of
his. The best bids and asks, as well as a list of
the residual bids and asks, were shown on the
computer screens of all traders. A buyer (seller)
could accept the best ask (bid) at any time
before the end of the trading period, and
thereby trigger a transaction. If a buyer (seller)
tried to propose or accept a bid (an ask)
implying a negative profit, he was warned by
the program and given an opportunity to alter
his message. Moreover, there was a con-
tinuously updated listing of confirmed prices
on all computer screens as well as a clock
showing seconds remaining of the trading
period. Each buyer (seller) could also see his
demand (supply) schedule and profits derived
from transactions during the prevailing
trading period. The computerized bid and
offer auctions were similar to the described
double auction procedures except that the bid
(offer) auction permitted buyers (sellers) only
to announce bids (asks).
Experimental procedures
Table I shows the experimental design and
gives information about mean payoffs
denoted in U.S. dollars. The first two sessions
were run at the University of Oslo, whereas
the last two were conducted at the University
of Nottingham. The Norwegian sessions used
post-graduate students in economics and
political science as subjects. The participants
in the English sessions were masters and
doctoral students in economics. Students were
invited to sign up for the experiments via e-
mail messages. 
The Norwegian (English) session mean
payoffs include individual show-up fees equal
to 10 (7) U.S. dollars4. For comparison,
efficient trading conducted at the mid-point
of the feasible price range implies an expected
payoff of 84 (69) U.S. dollars to each trader
in the Norwegian (English) sessions. The
implemented nominal discrepancy in
expected payoffs reflects the difference in
Norwegian and British GNP per capita levels
(Statistics Norway, 2001).
Each experimental session ran as follows:
Upon arriving at the laboratory subjects were
randomly assigned a computer terminal and a
trader role. After reading the written instruc-
tions and answering test questions, they
96 Morten Søberg
3. Asks and bids were required to be non-negative and strictly lower than 100 experimental dollars. The software
generated error messages that were displayed on the computer screen if a subject violated any of these constraints.
4. The subjects’ profits denoted in experimental dollars were originally converted to, and paid in, Norwegian 
kroner and British pounds. The listed values in U.S. dollars are based on the exchange rate that prevailed at the
time of the experiment.
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thetical alternatives labeled “X”, “Y” and “Z”5.
They were then taken through a self-paced
computerized introduction to the offer, bid
and double auction, and practiced trading in
each of these trading institutions. The shapes
of market demand and supply were similar to
those depicted in Figure 1, but the values
differed in that the feasible price range in the
offer, bid and double action test rounds was
(15, 85), (20, 80) and (25, 75), respectively. 
Finally, subjects voted in eight elections
and traded over the course of eight subsequent
trading rounds. Each laboratory session lasted
roughly two and a half hours. At the end of
each session the participants were privately
paid their aggregate earnings in cash.
Experimental results
Institutional preferences and trader type
The number of votes cast for each auction type
during the plurality rule sessions by buyers and
sellers is depicted in Table II. Each buyer and
seller casts eight ballots during a session. After
pooling across sessions, the buyers’ first choice
is the bid auction, attracting 37 ballots, the
equivalent of 58.73% of the buyers’ votes. This
auction type receives the highest vote share
amongst buyers in both sessions. The double
and offer auction obtains around one fifth of
the total buyer vote. 
On the other hand, the sellers appear to
vote overwhelmingly for the offer auction,
which receives 65.63% of their aggregate vote.
Again the double auction comes last, polling
just a single vote during session PR1. In sum,
plurality rule buyers’ and sellers’ first choice is
the auction type that restricts the ability to
Endogenous market institutions: Experimental evidence 97
5. The instructions are reproduced in Appendix A.
Table I. 
Session plan and payoffs
Session Date Voting rule Mean payoff: Buyers* Mean payoff: Sellers*
AV1 10/31/2001 Approval voting 46 120
PR1 10/31/2001 Plurality rule 99 55
AV2 11/15/2001 Approval voting 79 54
PR2 11/16/2001 Plurality rule 105 30
* Denoted in U.S. dollars
Table II. 
Plurality rule voting behavior, by trader type
Session Buyers Sellers
Bid auction Double auction Offer auction Bid auction Double auction Offer auction
# (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%)
PR1 20 (64.52) 4 (12.90) 7 (22.58) 8 (25.00) 1 (3.13) 23 (71.88)
PR2 17 (53.13) 8 (25.00) 7 (21.88) 7 (21.88) 6 (18.75) 19 (59.38)
Total 37 (58.73) 12 (19.05) 14 (22.22) 15 (23.44) 7 (10.94) 42 (65.63)
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market. 
Next, consider the degree of similarity of
individual voting behavior. This may be
measured by means of Kendall’s W (Kendall’s
coefficient of concordance). Kendall’s W is
defined on the unit interval, with W = 0 (1)
signifying perfect disagreement (agreement)
(see, e.g., Hollander and Wolfe, 1999).
Table III depicts the individual votes cast
by buyers during the plurality rule elections.
Including abstention, there are four feasible
voting options. In each session there are four
participating buyers; the third buyer in session
PR1 is identified as PR1-3, etc. Buyer PR1-1
consistently votes for the bid auction. Buyers
PR1-2 and PR2-3 cast bid-auction votes in
seven of the eight elections in which they
participate, whereas three buyers cast between
three and five votes for the offer auction.
Nevertheless, the bid auction receives 37 of
the total 64 ballots and the point estimate of
Kendall’s W is 0.578. The low probability
value implies that the null hypothesis of no
98 Morten Søberg
Table III. 
Plurality rule: Individual voting behavior, buyers
Buyer ID Blank Bid Double Offer
PR1-1 0 8 0 0
PR1-2 0 7 1 0
PR1-3 1 2 1 4
PR1-4 0 3 2 3
PR2-1 0 2 1 5
PR2-2 0 4 3 1
PR2-3 0 7 0 1
PR2-4 0 4 4 0
Total 1 37 12 14
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance: 0.578 P-value: 0.0014
Table IV. 
Plurality rule: Individual voting behavior, sellers
Seller ID Blank Bid Double Offer
PR1-1 0 6 1 1
PR1-2 0 2 0 6
PR1-3 0 0 0 8
PR1-4 0 0 0 8
PR2-1 0 0 0 8
PR2-2 0 4 2 2
PR2-3 0 2 1 5
PR2-4 0 1 3 4
Total 0 15 7 42
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance: 0.629 P-value: 0.0004
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plurality-rule buyers appear to cast votes in a
fairly consistent manner.
As can be seen in Table IV, a similar pattern
of consistent agreement is revealed by the
sellers’ voting behavior. Three sellers – PR1-3,
PR1-4 and PR2-1 – cast votes for the offer
auction only. Accordingly, the estimated
coefficient of concordance is 0.629 and highly
significant. 
Result 1: 
Buyers (sellers) first and foremost vote for the
bid (offer) auction. The voting behavior of
the individual buyers and seller shows a high
degree of concordance. 
A summary of approval votes is given in
Table V. The total number of votes cast by
buyers and sellers in each case exceeds 64 due
to double and triple voting. On average, the
double auction constitutes the sellers’
preferred auction type, while the bid auction
obtains the greatest vote share amongst
buyers. 
The individual voting behavior of approval
voting buyers is summarized in Table VI. Five
of the eight buyers cast vote ballots that
approve of more than just one trading
institution. Approximately 33% of the buyers’
votes are cast for two or all three trading
institutions. The point estimate of the
coefficient of concordance in this case is
Endogenous market institutions: Experimental evidence 99
Table V. 
Approval voting behavior, by trader type
Session Buyers Sellers
Bid auction Double auction Offer auction Bid auction Double auction Offer auction
# (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%)
AV1 24 (50.00) 11 (22.92) 13 (27.08) 9 (16.36) 22 (40.00) 24 (43.64)
AV2 10 (25.00) 12 (30.00) 18 (45.00) 19 (47.50) 18 (45.00) 3 (7.50)
Total 34 (38.63) 23 (26.14) 31 (35.22) 28 (29.47) 40 (42.11) 27 (28.42)
Table VI. 
Approval voting: Individual voting behavior, buyers
Buyer ID Blank Bid Double Offer Bid + Double Bid + Offer Double + Offer
AV1-1 0 1 1 3 1 2 0
AV1-2 0 8 0 0 0 0 0
AV1-3 0 1 3 0 3 0 1
AV1-4 2* 1 0 0 0 5 0
AV2-1 0 0 3 5 0 0 0
AV2-2 1 0 2 5 0 0 0
AV2-3 0 0 1 2 2 2 1
AV2-4 0 2 0 2 3 1 0
Total 3 13 10 17 9 10 2
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance: 0.217 P-value: 0.0819
* These vote ballots approved of all three auctions.
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However, the p-value of 0.0819 suggests that
this degree of conformity is only weakly
statistically significant.
The summary of individual vote ballots
cast by sellers in the approval-voting treatment
is shown in Table VII. Here, seven of the eight
sellers choose to approve of more than just
one auction in at least one election. Moreover,
exactly 50% of the votes are cast for two, or
all three, auction types. A noticeable majority
of the double votes approve of the double
auction. Nevertheless, in this case the
estimated coefficient of concordance is rather
low at 0.153, whereas the associated
probability value is as high as 0.2937. As a
result, there is no significant consensus as
regards the sellers’ individual voting behavior.
Result 2:
Approval voting behavior is distinctly
heterogeneous and not significantly con-
cordant. However, a majority of both buyers
and sellers cast votes that approve of more
than just one institutional candidate. In total,
52 (41%) of the approval voting ballots are
cast for two auction types, 37 (73%) of which
choose the double auction as well as either the
bid or the offer auction. 
Effective number of auctions
Table VIII gives an overview of the laboratory
elections. In the plurality-rule sessions the
double auction is chosen only once and
receives approximately 15% of the aggregate
vote. The residual votes are more or less evenly
split between the bid and offer auction, which
win 15 out of 16 elections. Given the
aggregate vote shares, the effective number of
auctions is 2.66. A strictly Duvergerian
outcome would yield two effective auctions
only. 
The switch to approval voting induces a
topsy-turvy effect, moving the last-place
double auction into first place with 34.43%
of the total vote. In the approval-voting
100 Morten Søberg
Table VII.
Approval voting: Individual voting behavior, sellers
Seller ID Blank Bid Double Offer Bid + Double Bid + Offer Double + Offer
AV1-1 1* 0 1 1 0 0 5
AV1-2 0 0 2 0 0 1 5
AV1-3 0 1 0 0 2 4 1
AV1-4 0 0 2 3 0 0 3
AV2-1 1 4 0 1 2 0 0
AV2-2 1 2 3 2 0 0 0
AV2-3 0 0 3 0 5 0 0
AV2-4 0 3 2 0 3 0 0
Total 3 10 13 7 12 5 14
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance: 0.153 P-value: 0.2937
* This vote ballot approved of all three auctions.
6. Let vi denote the share of the total vote received by auction i, i∈(bid auction, double auction, offer auction); 
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share of the vote. Accordingly, the pooled
effective number of auctions is marginally
below three. 
The EN values listed above indicate that
approval voting yields an increased number of
effective auctions relative to the plurality rule
benchmark. 
Result 3: 
Plurality rule induces a Duverger effect in the
sense that just two of the three alternatives –
the bid and offer auctions – win 15 of the 16
laboratory elections. Under approval voting
each auction wins approximately one third of
the elections, and the vote share of each
auction is in the region of 33%. Accordingly,
the number of effective auctions is
comparatively higher under approval voting.
The difference in the number of effective
auctions across voting rules is statistically
significant7. 
Auction prices
The following discussion is divided into two
parts. First, chronological sequences of asks,
bids and confirmed contract prices are
presented graphically, by session. Second, an
econometric analysis is employed to weed out
the effect of market institution on price
formation.
Figure 2 displays the time series of asks,
bids and prices during the plurality rule
session PR1. The offers to buy and sell as
well as confirmed prices are measured in
experimental dollars and plotted against time
in seconds. Note that each trading period
lasts 180 seconds. The employed auction
types are listed at top of the figure. At the
bottom of the figure the calculated mean
price (MP) is shown for each trading round.
Recall that prices by experimental design
need to be above 30 (below 70) dollars for
trading to be profitable for sellers (buyers),
whereas asks and bids are confined by the
utilized software to the interval (0,100)
experimental dollars. 
Bid-auction rules govern the first round of
trading in this session, and the initial bids are
around 10 experimental dollars. The bids then
increase over time, and confirmed prices in
the vicinity of 40 experimental dollars starts to
be registered during the middle phase of the
trading period. The offer auction won the
second election during session PR1 and was
consequently implemented during the second
trading round. The change of trading rules
seemingly implies a reversal of the preceding
trading process whereby asks are posted way
above the prices agreed to during the first
round. In particular, competition amongst the
sellers results in successively lower asks, some
of which are accepted towards the end of the
trading round. Furthermore, the change in
Endogenous market institutions: Experimental evidence 101
Table VIII. 
Election results
Voting rule Bid auction Double auction Offer auction Effective no. 
# wins % of vote # wins % of vote # wins % of vote of auctions
Plurality rule 7 40.94 1 14.96 8 44.09 2.60
Approval voting 4 33.88 6 34.43 6 31.69 2.99
7. Confer the econometric analysis contained in Appendix B.
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which is mirrored in the mean price increase
from 37.42 to 44.13 experimental dollars.
Conversely, prices fall when the bid auction
replaces offer auction rules in the fifth round. 
Analogous time series from the second
plurality rule session PR2 are depicted in
Figure 3. A general impression is that, again,
buyers (sellers) try during bid (offer) auction
trading to signal low (high) prices, but intra-
type competition amongst buyers (sellers)
seems to increase (decrease) bids (asks). 
The bid auction is implemented in the
fourth trading round, hence the price level
declines relative to the preceding offer auction
prices. The change to double auction and offer
auction rules in the subsequent rounds yields
higher prices. However, bid-auction trading
in the last round leads to another decrease in
the mean price. 
Figures 4 and 5 display time series of asks,
bids and prices recorded during the approval
voting sessions. The main characteristic of
session AV1 is relatively stable prices across
trading rounds. During the initial three
rounds of offer auction trading, sellers try to
trade at high prices but eventually settle for
prices around 60 experimental dollars. Asks
and bids announced during subsequent
rounds do not deviate markedly from this
level, and range between 70 and 50
experimental dollars. 
Figure 5 reveals a more erratic trading
pattern during session AV2. Prices fluctuate
distinctly during the first bid auction rounds,
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feasible price range. There is a discernable
difference in the behavior of buyers and sellers
throughout this laboratory session. When
allowed to initiate prices, buyers persist in
submitting bids noticeably below this level.
In contrast, sellers’ asks in general deviate less
from the established price level, and do not
vary to the same extent as the observed bids. 
On the whole, the graphical depiction of
confirmed prices indicates that auction rules
exert a visible degree of influence on the level
of prices. Moreover, the contracts formed
during the initial trading rounds seem to
anchor the price formation process during
subsequent rounds by means of establishing
an “acceptable” price level. However, the
preceding figures indicate that this level varies
noticeably across the four laboratory sessions.
There is also evidence of time effects in that
mean prices in the first trading rounds appear
to be consistently below prices agreed to
during ensuing trading rounds. 
After controlling for session and time
effects, the data show that bid (offer) trading
rules induces lower (higher) prices relative to
the double auction8. The point estimate in
the bid (offer) auction case is -1.53 (1.89)
experimental dollars. These institutional
effects are statistically significant.
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Figure 3. 
Asks, bids and prices, session PR2
8. Confer the econometric analysis contained in Appendix C.
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Auction prices vary markedly between sessions
and slightly over the course of sessions. When
controlling for these effects, the data reveal
that bid (offer) auction prices are lower
(higher) than double auction prices. The
magnitude of these differences is approxi-
mately equal as well as highly statistically
significant. 
Discussion
The plurality rule election results corroborate
Duverger’s law, which predicts that plurality
rule tends to reduce a three-candidate race to
just two effective candidates. Phrased in
economic terms, Duvergerian effects may be
interpreted as barriers to entry against a third
party (Myerson, 1995). The laboratory data
strongly suggest that plurality rule voters
choose by ballot to shut out the double
auction. Highly polarized laboratory
electorates drive these electoral results. A strict
majority of buyers’ (sellers’) votes is cast for
the bid (offer) auction. Hence, the voting
behavior induced by plurality rule reveals that
both trader types manifestly prefer to trade
on an auction that restricts the ability to
initiate prices to their own side of the market.
In contrast, close three-way races
characterize the institutional competition that
takes place under approval voting. The
number of effective auctions is consistently in
the vicinity of three, thereby rendering all
auctions viable electoral candidates.
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the double auction. This change is partly
explained by a majority of voters taking
advantage of the ability to express both first
and second choices: 41% of the approval-
voting ballots is cast for two institutional
alternatives, 73% of which approves of the
double auction.
The reported experiment is heuristic in the
sense that economic theory does not generate
precise predictions regarding the institutional
preferences of buyers and sellers. Instead, a
range of conjectures appears plausible: A priori,
buyers (sellers) may strictly prefer the offer
(bid) auction because competitive pressures
affecting the other side of the market may tend
to generate advantageous price levels. A
contrary second conjecture is equally likely if
buyers (sellers) believe that bid (offer) auction
rules will allow them to collude in dictating
beneficial terms of trade in the form of low
(high) prices. Certainly, indifference will be a
preferred option provided voters do not
perceive that prices are likely to differ markedly
across auction types, the implication of which
would be a large number of blank votes. The
last supposition is clearly refuted by the
laboratory evidence, whereas the plurality rule
ballots are consistent with the second
conjecture. In contrast, approval voting
induces individual voting behavior that to a
larger extent reflects both competitive pressure
and tacit collusion speculations, but primarily
mirror distinctly heterogeneous preferences.
Both plurality-rule and approval voting
elections take place in an incomplete
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payoff implications of choosing any auction
type are neither exogenous nor common
knowledge. Also, within any one session the
participants’ opportunity to assess the
empirical properties of the three alternative
auctions is limited, primarily because the
complete set of auctions is not necessarily
implemented. However, the price data from
the trading stage of the experiment facilitates
an  ex post assessment of the empirical
properties of the alternative trading
institutions. This appraisal is based upon a
fairly balanced sample consisting of prices
formed during eleven bid-auction, seven
double-auction and fourteen offer-auction
trading rounds9. After controlling for session
and time effects, the evidence shows that bid-
auction prices are significantly lower than
double-auction prices, which again tend to be
significantly lower than offer-auction prices.
Ceteris paribus, this ordering of prices
rationalizes buyers’ (sellers’) preferences for
the bid (offer auction) as revealed during the
plurality rule sessions. In addition, it implies
that the double auction amounts to a rational
second choice for both trader types. Moreover,
the majority of buyers’ and sellers’ double
votes in the approval voting sessions approve
of the double auction. 
In each trading round the number of asks
and/or bids outweighs the amount of
confirmed contract prices. The graphical
depictions of unaccepted price offers during
trading rounds governed by bid (offer) auction
rules suggest that competitive pressures are
operating amongst buyers (sellers) in the form
of increasing (decreasing) bids (asks). Similar
effects were anticipated by Smith (1964) to
favor the trader type prohibited from making
price quotes: Offer-auction rules could yield
competition amongst sellers for trading
opportunities and thus result in relatively low
prices, whereas in the bid auction the
competitive pressure would affect the buyers
and thereby imply increasing bids to buy as
well as relatively high prices. Using six
laboratory sessions and a symmetric market
environment with an equal number of buyers
and sellers, Smith found support for his a
priori hypothesis that bid-auction prices tend
to be greater than double-auction prices,
which again tend to be greater than offer-
auction prices. 
The ranking of auction prices ascertained
in this paper amounts to a reversal of Smith’s
findings. One reading of the present price
ordering is that competitive effects, as
reflected in chronological sequences of
unaccepted asks and/or bids, are offset by
aggressive price signaling: The level at which
buyers start increasing bids tends to be well
below the “acceptable” price level, and vice
versa with regard to sellers’ asks. Hence, tacit
collusion amongst buyers and sellers appears
to dominate the competitive pressures that
are simultaneously affecting their bargaining
behavior. The difference between these results
and Smith’s conclusion may, in part, stem
from dissimilar numbers of buyers and sellers.
Smith employed either 20 or 28 traders as
compared to eight in each of the sessions
reported above, and perhaps tacit collusion is
harder to sustain and competitive pressures
106 Morten Søberg
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been labeled a box design, and contrasts with the conventional choice in experimental economics of ordered
demand (supply) schedules that decrease (increase) in price. Price formation within a box design over the course
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the box design is particularly suited to laboratory analyses of how price formation may vary with alternative
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economic agents increases10. 
Conclusion
There is a wide variety of market institutions
in the field. A multitude of such institutions
may be characterized in terms of the ability to
initiate price quotes. Variants of English
(reverse) auctions enable buyers (sellers) only
to suggest prices, whereas the double auction
combines these alternatives. The emergence
of such market institutions may result from
history-specific interactions between
decentralized actions by economic agents
and/or deliberate legislative design. For
instance, Friedman (1993) has conjectured
that the specifics of a market institution may
be sensitive to environmental details, and may
be conjectured to reflect the institutional
preferences of a set of relevant traders and/or
policy makers.
The starting point of this paper is that the
emergence of market institutions is affected
by the institutional preferences of traders, as
well as by the decision process or voting rule
traders use – in a hypothetical “constitutional”
setting – to set up and agree upon trading
rules. The experimental data corroborate the
conjecture that type of voting rule – i.e., how
preferences are aggregated – markedly
influence the choice of market institution.
Specifically, voting rules matter in the sense
that plurality rule induces a Duverger effect
by which the bid (buyer) and offer (seller)
auction emerge as the only viable market
institutions. Thus, when buyers and sellers
express first choices only, one-sided market
institutions emerge that restrict the ability to
suggest prices to one side of the market.
Approval voting instead yields three effective
auctions with each auction winning
approximately one third of the elections as
well as the aggregate vote. Counting first and
second choices consequently implies a more
varied landscape of market institutions in
which the double auction figures alongside
the one-sided market institutions. 
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A.1. General
You are about to participate in a voting and trading experiment where you will have an
opportunity to earn money. The experiment is estimated to last approximately 2 hours and 30
minutes. The Norwegian Research Council has provided funding for this experiment. The
structure of the experiment is as follows: 
First, you participate in an election in which you cast a vote. The objective of this voting
stage is to choose a trading institution. The voting rules and the alternative trading
institutions are described below.
Second, you trade on the chosen trading institution. Four of the participants in this
experiment will act as buyers during this trading stage, whereas four participants are
going to be sellers. Details of the trading procedures are outlined below. 
This basic structure will be repeated eight times: You are going to take part in eight elections
and eight subsequent trading stages.
The amount of money that you make during the trading stages depends upon the market
prices. The money that you earn is tax-free and will be paid to you in private immediately after
the experiment. This experimental session will be conducted in the following manner:
1. Read these instructions carefully. Answer the test questions in writing. Try to finish reading
within 10 minutes from now. If you have any questions, please be so kind as to raise your
hand and the experimenter will assist you. You are not allowed to speak to any of the other
participants during this experiment.
2. Voting test: When everyone has finished reading the instructions you will practice your role
as a voter in a test election.
3. Trading test: Then you are going to be introduced to the computer software that will be
used during the trading stages. You will practice your role as a trader on each of the three
alternative trading institutions. No money is earned during this part of the experiment. 
4. The experimental elections and trading begin.
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A.2. Voting: Alternatives and voting rules
In each election there will be three alternative trading institutions to choose amongst (details
on these trading institutions are given in section A.3. below). Listed alphabetically, the
alternatives are as follows:
• Ask auction
• Ask and bid auction
• Bid auction
In an election you can vote for one of these alternatives (“Ask auction” or “Ask and bid
auction” or “Bid auction”). You may also abstain, that is, cast a blank vote. Which
alternative you vote for will not be revealed to the other voters. The votes are going to
be counted in public and the complete election results will be listed on the blackboard.
The chosen trading institution is the one that is chosen by the largest number of voters.
In the event of ties (2 or 3 trading institutions get an equal number of votes), the winner
is determined by the throw of a fair die (each alternative has an equal probability of
winning). 
Example 1: Suppose 8 persons (represented by the numbers 1 – 8) vote in the following way
(the sign ÷ denotes a vote. Absence of such a sign indicates a blank vote):
Alternatives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Number of votes
Ask auction √√ √ 3
Ask and bid auction √√ 2
Bid auction √√ 2
In this example the “Ask auction” wins the election with 3 votes. Person 5 cast a blank vote. 
Example 2: Now consider this voting outcome:
Alternatives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Number of votes
Ask auction √√ √ 3
Ask and bid auction √√2
Bid auction √√ √ 3
In Example 2 both the “Bid auction” and the “Ask auction” gets 3 votes each. The election is
then decided by the throw of a die. This means that either the “Ask auction” or the “Bid
auction” wins the election with probability 0.5.
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Consider the hypothetical election results listed in the following table. Count the number of
votes.
Alternatives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Number of votes
Ask auction √√
Ask and bid auction √√
Bid auction √√
Which trading institution is chosen?
Specific instructions for approval voting sessions AV1 and AV2:
A.2. Voting: Alternatives and voting rules
In each election there will be three alternative trading institutions to choose amongst (details
on these trading institutions are given in section A.3. below). Listed alphabetically, the
alternatives are as follows:
• Ask auction
• Ask and bid auction
• Bid auction
In an election you can vote for one, two or all three of these alternatives (“Ask auction”
and/or “Ask and bid auction” and/or “Bid auction”). You may also abstain, that is, cast
a blank vote. Which alternative(s) you vote for will not be revealed to the other voters.
The votes are going to be counted in public and the complete election results will be
listed on the blackboard.
The chosen trading institution is the one that gets the largest number of votes. In the
event of ties (2 or 3 trading institutions get an equal number of votes), the winner is
determined by the throw of a fair die (each alternative has an equal probability of
winning). 
Example 1: 
Suppose 8 persons (represented by the numbers 1 – 8) vote in the following way (the sign √
denotes a vote. Absence of such a sign indicates a blank vote):
Alternatives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Number of votes
Ask auction √√ √ √ √ 5
Ask and bid auction √√√ 3
Bid auction √√ √ 3
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2 votes for the “Ask and bid auction” whereas person 3 votes for all three trading institutions.
In terms of the final result, voting for all three trading institutions is equivalent to abstaining
from voting, which is what person 5 in this example does. 
Counting all the votes, you see that the “Ask auction” wins the election with 5 votes in total.
Example 2: 
Now consider this voting outcome:
Alternatives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Number of votes
Ask auction √√ √ 3
Ask and bid auction √√ √√ 4
Bid auction √√ √ √ 4
In this example both the “Ask and bid auction” and the “Bid auction” gets 4 votes each. The
election is then decided by the throw of a die. This means that either the “Ask and bid auction”
or the “Bid auction” wins the election with probability 0.5.
Question 1:
Consider the hypothetical election results listed in the following table. Count the number of
votes.
Alternatives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Number of votes
Ask auction √√√ √
Ask and bid auction √√ √ √
Bid auction √√√ √
Which trading institution is chosen?
Specific instructions for buyers (all sessions):
A.3. Trading 
A.3.1. Trader role 
In each of the 8 trading stages of this experiment you are going to be a buyer of a fictitious good
on a computerized market. Each trading stage lasts 180 seconds. Apart from you there are 3
other buyers and 4 sellers on this market.
Your “value” from buying units of the good in this experiment is shown numerically on
your computer screen. You earn money by buying units at prices below your value. You can buy
one unit at a time.
Example 3:
Your value associated with buying maximum 4 units of the good may look like this on your
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Specifically, if you buy 1 unit of the good for a price equal to 200, your profit in this example
becomes (550 – 200) = 350 and will be depicted on your computer screen in this manner:
Value Price Quantity Profit




If you buy 3 units of the good for prices equal to 300, 100 and 250, your profit can be calculated
as follows: (550 – 300) + (550 – 100) + (550 – 250) = 1000. Note that buying at prices above
550 would be unprofitable. This is a graphical illustration of these three transactions: 
Value Price Quantity Profit
550 300 1 250
550 100 1 450
550 250 1 300
550 1
Question 2:
Given the values shown in Example 3: What is your profit if you buy the first unit for a price
equal to 300, the second unit for 150 and the third unit and the fourth unit at a price equal to
200? 
A.3.2. Trading rules
How trading prices are determined depends on the trading institution. Here the trading rules
that characterize each of the three alternative trading institutions are explained:
In the “Ask auction”, the sellers can formulate offers to sell. An offer to sell is called an
ask and specifies the price a seller wants for one unit of the good. As a buyer you can buy
a unit by accepting an ask from a seller. 
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bid and specifies the price at which a buyer wants to buy a unit. As a buyer you get to
buy a unit of the good if a seller accepts your bid.
In the “Ask and bid auction”, the sellers can specify asks and the buyers can specify bids.
Thus, you can buy a unit of the good in two ways: Either a seller accepts a bid from you,
or you accept an ask from a seller.
During the trading stages all asks, bids and prices (that is, accepted asks and/or bids) will be
nominated in experimental dollars. At the end of the experiment the aggregated profit is
converted to Norwegian kroner and paid to you in cash by the experimenter. In this experiment
the conversion rate is 1:1, meaning that one experimental dollar equals one Norwegian krone11.
Question 3:
Who (buyers and/or sellers) suggest/propose and who accept/determine the level of prices in the
- Ask auction?
- Ask and bid auction?
- Bid auction?
Final remarks: This has been a preliminary introduction to the trading institutions only.
Afterwards you will practice how to trade at your own pace by means of a computerized
learning scheme. Note that in the computer program, “trading period” means trading stage.
Also, “total earnings” will be shown on your computer screen, but will be zero: Instead the
experimenter keeps track of your aggregate earnings.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. Otherwise please wait until the experiment
continues.
Specific instructions for sellers (all sessions):
A.3. Trading 
A.3.1. Trader role 
In each of the 8 trading stages of this experiment you are going to be a seller of a fictitious good
on a computerized market. Each trading stage lasts 180 seconds. Apart from you there are 3
other sellers and 4 buyers on this market.
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money by selling units at prices above your cost. You can sell one unit at a time.
Example 3:
Your cost associated with selling maximum 4 units of the good may look like this on your
computer screen (but will assume different values during the experiment):





Specifically, if you sell 1 unit of the good for a price equal to 750, your profit in this example
becomes (750 – 550) = 200 and will be depicted on your computer screen in this manner:
Price Cost Quantity Profit




If you sell 3 units of the good for prices equal to 850, 600 and 800, your profit can be calculated
as follows: (850 – 550) + (600 – 550) + (800 – 550) = 700. Note that selling for prices below
550 would be unprofitable. This is a graphical illustration of these three transactions:
Price Cost Quantity Profit
850 550 1 300
600 550 1 150
800 550 1 250
550 1
Question 2:
Given the costs shown in Example 3: What is your profit if you sell the first unit for a price
equal to 750, the second unit for 700 and the third unit and the fourth unit at a price equal to
900? 
A.3.2. Trading rules
How trading prices are determined depends on the trading institution. Here the trading rules
that characterize each of the three alternative trading institutions are explained:
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ask and specifies the price a seller wants for one unit of the good. As a seller you get to
sell a unit if a buyer accepts your ask.
In the “Bid auction”, the buyers can formulate offers to buy. An offer to buy is called a
bid and specifies the price at which a buyer wants to buy a unit. As a seller you can sell
a unit of the good by accepting a bid from a buyer.
In the “Ask and bid auction”, the sellers can specify asks and the buyers can specify bids.
Thus, you can sell a unit of the good in two ways: Either a buyer accepts an ask from
you, or you accept a bid from a buyer.
During the trading stages all asks, bids and prices (that is, accepted asks and/or bids) will be
nominated in experimental dollars. At the end of the experiment the aggregated profit is
converted to Norwegian kroner and paid to you in cash by the experimenter. In this experiment
the conversion rate is 1: 1, meaning that one experimental dollar equals one Norwegian krone.
Question 3:
Who (buyers and/or sellers) suggest/propose and who accept/determine the level of prices in
the
- Ask auction? 
- Ask and bid auction?
- Bid auction?
Final remarks: This has been a preliminary introduction to the trading institutions only.
Afterwards you will practice how to trade at your own pace by means of a computerized
learning scheme. Note that in the computer program, “trading period” means trading stage.
Also, “total earnings” will be shown on your computer screen, but will be zero: Instead the
experimenter keeps track of your aggregate earnings. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. Otherwise please wait until the experiment
continues.
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The following random-effects panel data model is used to evaluate whether voting rules affect
the effective number of auctions in a statistically significant manner:
(1) ENi,t = α + βVoting ruleDi,t
Voting rule + εi,t + ui
where subscript i denotes session (i∈{AV1, PR1, AV2, PR2}), and t signifies election number
within any one session (t∈{1, 2, .. , 8}). The dependent variable EN measures the effective
number of auctions in an election, and α is a constant term. The binary variable DVoting rule
measures the qualitative shifts of voting rules, and assumes the value 1 under approval voting.
ui is a random disturbance pertaining to the ith session. Both ui and the classical error term εi, t
are assumed to be identically and independently distributed with zero mean and constant
variance. The covariance between the two disturbance terms is supposed to be zero across both
sessions and election rounds (Greene, 2000): 
(2) εi,t ~ iiN(0,σε
2)
(3) u i ~ iiN(0,σε
2)
(4) E[εi,tuj]  =  0, i t j
Table IX contains the regression estimates. The principal result is that substituting approval
voting for plurality rule causes a statistically significant increase in the number of effective
auctions. The point estimate of the number of effective auctions under approval voting is 2.8
as compared to 2.27 when plurality rule applies. 
Table IX. 
Estimated parameters for the model  ENi,t = α + βVoting ruleDi,t
Voting rule + εi,t + ui
Parameter Estimate t-ratio P-value*
α 2.269 14.517 0.0000
βVoting rule 0.532 2.405 0.0081
Mean value of EN: 2.55 Standard deviation of EN: 0.47
Number of observations:  32 R2: 0.33
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The objective of the following econometric analysis of auction prices is to investigate whether
price levels vary with auction types as well as to disentangle the effect of sessions and trading
round sequence from the impact of alternations in trading rules. The following fixed-effects
panel data model will be used to evaluate these separate effects on individual contract prices. It
is estimated with a first-order autocorrelated error structure to correct for interdependencies
between price observations within sessions12. 





Offer auction + εi,t(i)
(6) εi,t(i) = ρεi,t(i)–1 + ηi,t(i)
(7) εi,t(i) ~ iiN(0,σε
2)
(8) ηi,t(i) ~ iiN(0,ση
2)
Each variable and disturbance term is indexed relative to session i∈{AV1, PR1, AV2, PR2} and
observation number t(i). The latter is session dependent because the number of prices varies
across sessions. In particular, {t(AV1), t(PR1), t(AV2), t(PR2)}={128, 117, 126, 127}13. Hence,
the dependent variable Pi, t(i) is the t(i)-th contract price in session i. In equation (5) αi is a
session specific constant term, and Dj
Trading roundis a binary variable that takes the value 1 during
trading round j, j∈{2, 3, .. , 8}. The binary variables DBid auction and DOffer auction equal 1 whenever
trading is governed by bid-auction and offer-auction rules, respectively. 
Table X lists the regression results. The estimates of the session-specific constants at the top
of the table confirm the visual impression of marked price differences across laboratory sessions.
The first R2 statistic at the bottom of the table shows that the model as fitted explains 83% of
the variability in prices14. Also, the data support statistically significant time effects. Relative to
the first trading round, prices are generally higher in six of the seven subsequent trading
periods, but there is a discernible price decrease from the fifth trading period onwards.
After controlling for session and time effects, the regression estimates show that bid (offer)
trading rules induce lower (higher) prices relative to the double auction. The point estimate in
the bid (offer) auction case is -1.53 (1.89) experimental dollars. These institutional effects are
statistically significant.
118 Morten Søberg
12. Formally, a Durbin-Watson test implies the rejection of zero autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson statistic for
panel data dp = 0.96, whereas the 5% significance points of the upper (lower) bound of dp i = 6 and t = 100
equals 1.82 (1.91) (Bhargava et al., 1982).
13. The maximum number of price observations within any trading round is 16. Thus, at most, 128 prices may be
formed during a laboratory session.
14. The marked price level differentials across sessions are consistent with the variance in buyer and seller mean pay-
offs depicted in Table I. 
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Offer auction + εi,t(i)
1. Session effects
Parameter  AV1 PR1 AV2  PR2
Estimate 57.83  41.34  44.60 35.60 
P-value 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
2. Trading round (time) effects
Parameter  2 3 4  5 6 7 8 
Estimate  2.74 0.80 2.12 2.37 2.22 1.87 1.70 
P-value  0.0000 0.2596 0.0030 0.0028 0.0101 0.0070 0.0130 
3. Auction type effects
Parameter  Bid auction  Offer auction 
Estimate -1.53  1.89 
P-value 0.0118  0.0148 
Number of observations:  494 Estimated autocorrelation of e: 0.519
Mean value of P (experimental dollars): 46.80 Standard deviation of P: 8.98 
R2: 0.83
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